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In the unbundled national electricity markets in Europe, the balancing market is the institutional
arrangement that deals with the balancing of electricity demand and supply. This paper presents a
framework for policy makers that identiﬁes the relevant design variables and performance criteria that
play a role in the design and analysis of European balancing markets. We outline the full extent of the
design challenge through a discussion of trade-offs among performance criteria, uncertain effects of
design variables, and the many inter-linkages between the balancing market and the electricity market at
large. Policy makers can address the balancing market design challenge by adopting a structured
approach in which design variables, performance criteria, market conditions, system developments, and
resultant market incentives are explicitly considered.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1 No documentation has been found of the decision making on early national
balancing market legislation. Two balancing market experts from TenneT indicated
that these have likely been relatively simple, implicit and internal processes. For
example, the initial Dutch balancing rules have been developed by looking at the
Swedish design and adapting for the differences in generation mix, and by aiming1. Introduction
The topic of electricity balancing market design has been given
relatively little attention by academic researchers, despite its
crucial role in both power markets and power system operations.
Electricity must be ‘consumed’ as soon as it is produced, because it
cannot be stored easily. Balance management is a power system
operation service vital for ensuring security of supply through the
continuous, real-time balancing of power demand and supply. At
each point in time, total production must be equal to total con-
sumption in order to stabilize system frequency; it is therefore also
called frequency control. If the system runs out of balance, power
stability and quality will deteriorate, which may trigger the
disconnection of system components, and ultimately, power
blackouts. In vertically integrated electricity systems, it is relatively
easy to maintain the system balance, but unbundling in European
energy markets, which was initiated by Electricity Directive 96/92/
EC, has separated the power transmission segment from power
generation and supply. This has made balance management a much
more difﬁcult task, and necessitated the provision of incentives to
ensure that electricity market participants schedule electricity
production and consumption and stick to these schedules, andP, Balancing Service Provider;
(R.A.C. van der Veen), r.a.provide balancing services to the System Operator. However, in
countries without an unbundled, competitive electricity market,
the design task has been less urgent and simpler, and there we can
refer to a ‘balancing model’ or ‘balancing approach’ (Energy
Community Regulatory Board, 2012). As unbundling took a
different pace in European countries, national policy makers made
their own choices in setting the detailed balancing market rules,
based on national power system and market conditions and na-
tional and individual objectives.1
The balancing market is the institutional arrangement that es-
tablishes market-based balance management in an unbundled
electricity market.2 It can be considered the last in a sequence of
electricity markets, after year-ahead, month-ahead, day-ahead and
intra-day markets (ERGEG, 2009). However, the design of the
balancing market is more intricate, as it lies at the junction of
ﬁnancial transactions (the power market) and physical exchangesfor appropriate incentives to market players (personal communication, Frank Nobel
and Fijko Wenting, Arnhem and Heteren, summer 2015).
2 In the draft Network Code on Electricity Balancing, the balancing market is
deﬁned as ‘the entirety of institutional, commercial and operational arrangements
that establish market-based management of the function of Balancing’, with
‘Balancing’ being deﬁned as ‘all actions and processes, on all timelines, through
which TSOs ensure, in a continuous way, to maintain the system frequency within a
predeﬁned stability range’ (ENTSO-E, 2014a).
3 In fact, it appears that for many variables some of the TSOs were not even able
to indicate their design choice, and for some variables one of the design options is
vaguely called ‘hybrid’, which emphasizes the multitude and intricacy of existing
balancing markets in Europe.
4 The framework is one of the main products of a PhD research on balancing
market design (van der Veen, 2012). A more extensive description can be found in
the dissertation.
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In this paper, we aim to provide an overview of the decisions
and evaluation criteria that play a role in balancing market design,
by presenting a design framework to support policy makers (na-
tional governments, regulators, and System Operators). Further-
more, we elaborate by delineating the scope of the design
challenge, which also underpins the value of the framework. The
focus of this paper is on European markets that include a voluntary
power exchange and bilateral markets, rather than a centralised
power pool as common in the United States (Stoft, 2002). The topic
of harmonizing and integrating national balancingmarkets is out of
the scope of this analysis. The paper builds upon the research by
van der Veen (2012).
In Section 2, we present literature on European balancing mar-
ket design. Section 3 provides the developed balancing market
design framework. The scope of the design challenge is discussed in
Section 4 by drawing attention to the performance criteria trade-
offs, the impact of design variables, and the inter-linkage of the
balancing market with the electricity sector. This leads to a set of
design principles for policy makers. Finally, Section 5 gives the
conclusions of this work.
2. Literature review
In this section, we describe the balancing market design litera-
ture that formed a basis for the development of our framework.
This requires the use of some key terms that are explained in the
design framework in Section 3.
Vandezande et al. (2008) have provided a ﬁrst overview in
literature of balancing market design options. The authors make a
high-level distinction between design aspects related to procure-
ment of balancing services and design aspects related to delivery
and settlement. Three categories of design options are included
under procurement of balancing services: balancing service deﬁ-
nitions, times and methods of procurement, and methods for
remuneration. Delivery and settlement includes four design op-
tions: gate closure times, settlement periods, methods of imbalance
volume calculation, and methods of imbalance pricing. Herewith,
the authors present a logical, high-level classiﬁcation of design
options related to service types, used methods for the main
balancing market activities, time aspects, and pricing aspects.
Rebours et al. (2007) and Rebours (2008) describe eight
fundamental issues in the design of ancillary service markets (of
which balancing service markets form a subset). However, these
issues are oriented towards mandatory power pools such as the
PJM market in the U.S., and concern design principles rather than
design options. Most identiﬁed design options in these sources are
also given by Vandezande et al. (2008), with the exception of three
variables: the scoring of balancing service offers (which deals with
the order of selection of balancing bids), the allocation method
used for allocating procurement costs, and the publication of
market data.
Next, Abbasy (2012) describes the time-related design choices
playing a role in balancing service market design under the com-
mon variable ‘timing of balancing service markets’. This variable
includes twomain aspects: timing of bid procedure, which involves
the frequency of bidding and the gate opening and closure times of
balancing service markets, and timing of market clearance, which
concerns both the frequency of clearance and the coordinationwith
clearance of other (short-term) electricity markets.
Several reports on balancing markets and balancing market
integration by the former market-oriented organisation of Euro-
pean Transmission System Operators (ETSO) describe numerous
design variables (ETSO, 2005, 2006, 2007). A large part of these
consists of design options also covered by Vandezande et al. (2008).Four new variables identiﬁed in these reports are the balancing
service requirements, reserve volume requirements (i.e., the
amount of balancing capacity demanded by the SystemOperator), a
planned balance for the energy schedule (i.e., matching schedules
for production and consumption), and the allocation of the net
income for the SO of balance settlement (imbalance payments
minus remuneration of procured balancing services).
Finally, a survey of European TSOs about the current national
balancing market design by ENTSO-E, the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity, provides a compar-
ative overview for twenty-seven ENTSO-E member countries
(ENTSO-E, 2014b). The covered design options are in line with the
literature. The survey reveals the wide variety of choices made
across Europe for each particular design variable. For example,
automatic Frequency Regulation Reserves are settled pay as bid in
seven countries, with a marginal price in seven other countries, and
with a regulated price in four countries.3
Balancing market performance criteria are not well described in
the literature. Often, these criteria are considered implicitly, or
constitute lower-level indicators that cover the relevant balancing
market objectives only partially. Importantly, Frontier Economics
and Consentec (2005) have mentioned three high-level perfor-
mance criteria: economic efﬁciency, security of supply, and inte-
gration implementation costs. Furthermore, Vandezande (2011)
positions a cost-reﬂective balancing market design as a precondi-
tion for the efﬁcient functioning of electricity markets, putting
forward the criterion of cost-reﬂectivity.
3. Balancing market design framework
Using the literature described in Section 2 as a starting point, we
have developed a balancing market design framework.4 It consists
of three parts: a reference model, a performance criteria set, and a
design space. The reference model introduces and deﬁnes the
balancingmarket concepts. The performance criteria set offers a set
of high-level balancing market performance criteria, while the
design space lists the relevant balancing market design variables.
Herewith, the design framework can support policy-making by
aiding in the establishment of a common understanding of the
design task, and in the consideration of all relevant design options
and decision criteria. Additionally, it may facilitate further research
on the role of the balancing market.
3.1. Reference model
In the reference model the structure of the balancing market is
deﬁned. A balancing market consists of three main phases (balance
planning, balancing service provision, and balance settlement) and
concerns three main actors (the System Operator (SO), Balancing
Service Providers (BSPs), and Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs)).
In the balance planning phase, BRPs submit energy schedules to the
SO on the day before delivery, stating planned energy generation
and consumption for each Schedule Time Unit (STU) within the day
of delivery. In the balancing service provision phase, BSPs submit
balancing service bids to the SO, which are procured by the SO in
price order to secure the system balance. In the balance settlement
phase, energy imbalances (schedule deviations) of BRPs and
Fig. 1. Basic structure of the balancing market, ordered by time of occurrence (horizontal) and by actor (vertical). Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) are remunerated for balancing
services provided to the System Operator (SO). The balancing energy costs are allocated to the Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs) in the form of imbalance costs. Shown are in-
formation ﬂows (black arrowhead) and money ﬂows (white arrowhead) between different actors.
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provided upward regulation receive the upward regulation price if
marginal pricing is used, or the bid price in case of pay-as-bid
pricing (in euro/MWh). BSPs who provided downward regulation
pay the downward regulation price, or the bid price.5 BRPs with a
shortage pay the short imbalance price for each MWh of deviation,
and BRPs with a surplus receive the long imbalance price. Imbal-
ance prices are based on the regulation prices or costs, and thus
reﬂect real-time system balancing costs; these costs are allocated to
the BRPs, which face a proportionate incentive to balance their
energy portfolio. A schematic of the balancing market structure is
shown in Fig. 1.
Balancing services consist of two main types: balancing energy
(the real-time adjustment of balancing resources6 to maintain the
system balance) and balancing capacity (the contracted option to
dispatch balancing energy during the contract period). Selected
bids in the balancing capacity market are transferred to the
balancing energy market. Furthermore, one can also differentiate
between upward regulation and downward regulation, and be-
tween Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR), Frequency Regula-
tion Reserve (FRR), and Replacement Reserve (RR),7 which vary in
function and activation method.5 Providers of downward regulation who are saving fuel costs thanks to ramping
down of their power plants will still proﬁt if they pay less than their fuel costs. If
the downward regulation price is negative, the providers actually receive this price.
6 Balancing resources are the physical generation resources (power plants) and
consumption resources (adjustable load) that have the ﬂexibility and capability to
provide balancing services.
7 These terms have been adopted more recently by ENTSO-E. Previously, the
terms primary, secondary and tertiary control (reserves), respectively, were used.3.2. Performance criteria set
The performance criteria set includes the high-level criteria
with which the performance of balancing markets can be evalu-
ated. Two fundamental balancing market requirements are eco-
nomic efﬁciency and security of supply. We have formulated four
criteria that correspond with economic efﬁciency and three per-
formance criteria that correspond with security of supply as well as
two market-facilitation criteria.
The short deﬁnitions of the performance criteria are as follows.
3.2.1. Security-of-supply criteria
 Availability of balancing resources is the availability of resources
for meeting reserve requirements and resolving system imbal-
ances in real-time.
 Balance planning accuracy is deﬁned as the accuracy with which
energy schedules reﬂect actual energy exchanges, i.e., the ac-
curacy with which the system balance is planned.
 Balance quality is the effectiveness of maintaining the control
area balance, i.e., keeping to scheduled cross-border exchanges,
and maintaining system frequency, i.e., keeping to nominal
system frequency (which is 50 Hz in Europe).3.2.2. Economic efﬁciency criteria
 Cost allocation efﬁciency concerns the efﬁciency with which the
balancing service costs are allocated to the market, i.e., whether
market parties pay for balance management to the degree that
they beneﬁt from it (or have caused the need for it).
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utilisation of available balancing resources, i.e., the degree to
which the least and cheapest balancing resources are used to
maintain the system balance.
 Price efﬁciency involves the cost-reﬂectivity of balancing service
prices paid to BSPs.
 Operational efﬁciency concerns the economic efﬁciency of
handling the transactions related to the administrative pro-
cesses in the balancing market, including those of energy
schedule and balancing service bid submission and balance
settlement.3.2.3. Market-facilitation criteria
 Transparency concerns the information availability, symmetry
and clarity on balancing market design and performance.
 Non-discrimination involves the equality of balancing market
rules and conditions for different market parties (BRPs and
BSPs).
The performance criteria included are in alignment with the
objectives stated in the Framework Guidelines8 (ACER, 2012).
Furthermore, a survey conducted among balancing market experts
conﬁrmed the importance of these criteria (van der Veen, 2012).
3.3. Design space
The design space provides a comprehensive and high-level
overview of (national) balancing market design variables, group-
ed by market phase. Short deﬁnitions of the design variables are
provided below.
3.3.1. General variables
 Schedule Time Unit (STU): The main time unit in the balancing
market, which divides balance responsibility between the SO
and the BRPs (i.e., the market). It is the time period over which
energy schedules and balancing service bids are speciﬁed. An
alternative term is ‘(imbalance) settlement period’.
 Publication of national information: The decision regarding
which balancing market information is distributed to the mar-
ket, in what form, and how often. A distinction can be made
between information on the market design itself and market
results (data on balancing service bid volumes and prices, and
imbalance volumes and prices).3.3.2. Balance planning variables
 Zonal vs. nodal responsibility: The geographical aggregation level
at which BRPs must submit energy schedules. If BRPs must
submit energy schedules for each network node, and are
penalised for deviation per node, ‘nodal balancing’ is applied. If
energy schedules are at the level of geographically deﬁned
subsystems of the control area, ‘zonal balancing’ is applied.8 The Framework Guidelines stipulate that European balancing rules should
pursue the objectives of operational security, competition, non-discrimination,
transparency, efﬁciency, and social welfare, promote cross-border exchanges, and
facilitate wider participation of demand response and renewable energy sources
(ACER, 2012). The last two objectives are not directly covered in our criteria set, as
they do not measure the performance of balancing markets. However, they do
contribute to higher efﬁciency and effectiveness of balancing, by increasing the
availability of balancing resources. Responsibility for renewable generation: The distribution of bal-
ance responsibility for renewable generation between the
market (BRPs) and the SO. Balance responsibility for renewable
generation may lie completely or partially with the SO, or
renewable producers may have the same balance responsibility
as conventional producers.
 Net vs. separate positions: The deﬁnition of existing BRP bal-
ances. If separate production and consumption positions exist,
BRPs have to submit separate energy schedules for production
and consumption that are settled separately. If a ‘net position’
applies, there is only one type of scheduled position that in-
cludes both generation and consumption.
 Final gate closure time: The time at which the energy schedules
of BRPs become ﬁnal, typically around 1 h before the time of
delivery. Between the initial and ﬁnal gate closure time, BRPs
can submit adapted energy schedules to the SO, which replace
the last submitted version.
 Initial gate closure time: The time at which BRPs must submit an
initial energy schedule to the SO.9 Often, this is right after day-
ahead market clearing, for all the STUs on the day of delivery.
 BRP accreditation requirements: The requirements a market
party must meet to become authorised by the SO as a Balance
Responsible Party. These usually concern a certain ﬁnancial se-
curity, and the technical capability to exchange information
with the SO in the right data format and in a timely fashion.3.3.3. Balancing service provision variables
 Balancing service classes: The main classes of balancing services,
which have different functions and technical characteristics.
ENTSO-E distinguishes between Frequency Containment Re-
serves, Frequency Regulation Reserves, and Replacement Re-
serves, for which different procurement and control
requirements are stipulated (ENTSO-E, 2013).
 Reserve requirements: The control area requirements for pro-
curement of balancing capacity, including requested volumes
and technical characteristics of the balancing resources. These
are speciﬁed separately for each of the balancing service classes.
 Control system: The control system used for activation of
balancing energy, concerning the use of manual vs. automatic
control, and decentralised vs. centralised control. In continental
Europe, Frequency Containment Reserve (primary control) is a
decentralised automatic service that is activated in a matter of
seconds, Frequency Regulation Reserve (secondary control) is a
centralised and often automatic service that is activated by
means of Load-Frequency Control in a matter of minutes, and
Replacement Reserve (tertiary control) is a centralised and often
manual service that is activated within minutes up to hours
(UCTE, 2009).
 Methods of procurement: The main methods used to procure
balancing services. Balancing services are often provided by
BSPs to the SO through bidding in balancing service markets.
Different balancing service markets may be installed for
different service classes and types. Alternatively, balancing
services could be acquired by SOs through bilateral contracting,
through an obligation for BSPs to provide balancing services, or
the SOs may own balancing resources themselves.
 Timing of balancing service markets: This variable encompasses
the timing of bid procedures (time horizon of markets), and the9 With an initial energy schedule submission the SO obtains information to plan
the system balance and possibly energy transports well in advance, and has more
time to check the consistency of the energy schedules.
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other markets). The timing of bid procedures involves the
opening and closure times of balancing service bid submission,
relative to the market clearing times. The timing of market
clearance consists of the frequency of balancing service market
clearance and the coordination with the clearance of day-ahead
and intra-day markets (Abbasy, 2012).
 Balancing service pricing mechanisms: The pricing mechanisms
used for settlement of selected bids in the different balancing
service markets. Two market-based pricing mechanisms are
pay-as-bid pricing andmarginal pricing, where selected bids are
remunerated with the price of the last activated bid in price
order. In case of regulated pricing, the prices are partially or fully
determined by price regulations.
 Activation strategy: The strategy or procedure applied by the SO
regarding the activation of balancing service bids, including
order of activation (the degree to which the SO deviates from
merit order) and time of activation (proactive vs. reactive).
 Bid requirements: The requirements that balancing service bids
must meet. These may contain requirements about bid price,
volume, grid location, response speed, regulating speed, acti-
vation time, activation duration, and activation method, among
others.
 BSP accreditation requirements: The requirements a market party
must meet to become an authorised Balancing Service Provider.
These concern the technical pre-qualiﬁcation of balancing re-
sources, and the capability to exchange informationwith the SO.3.3.4. Balance settlement variables
 Allocation of balancing capacity costs: The method used to allo-
cate the balancing capacity costs. These costs are usually allo-
cated to all system users through adaptation of the system
services tariff. Alternatives are an additional price component in
the imbalance price, a separate fee structure for BRPs, and the
assignment of reserve obligations to market participants.
 Allocation of balancing energy costs: The method used to allocate
the balancing energy costs. Imbalance settlement serves to
allocate the balancing energy costs to the BRPs in proportion to
their energy imbalances. An alternative may be to recover a part
of the balancing energy costs through the system services
tariff10.
 Imbalance pricing mechanism: The pricing mechanism used to
determine the short and long imbalance prices. A main design
choice for this variable is whether these prices are identical
(‘single pricing’) or not (‘dual pricing’). Other design choices
concern the balancing costs or prices on which the imbalance
prices are based, whether price components are added, and
whether the imbalance pricing rules are dependent on certain
criteria reﬂecting the system balance quality.
 Penalty for non-delivery: The penalty that BSPs pay for not
delivering requested balancing energy.11
 Allocation of net settlement sum: The allocation of net income or
expenditure from balance settlement (imbalance payments10 In essence, imbalance settlement can be considered an indispensable part of
the balancing market, as market participants must have an incentive to deliver the
energy that they sold in the market, and thus should be charged for imbalances.
11 If the SO adjusts the energy schedules of corresponding BRPs based on
requested balancing energy, non-delivery will be subject to imbalance settlement.
In such systems, the penalty for non-delivery would be an additional penalty. In
order to verify balancing energy delivery, the SO must receive measurement values
of balancing resources with intervals of several seconds, as STU values are insuf-
ﬁcient (Lampropoulos, 2014).minus remuneration of procured balancing services) at the
system level. Possible allocationmethods include the adaptation
of the system services tariff, adaptation of imbalance prices,
separate fees for BRPs, or allocation to the SO as income.
 Timing of settlement: The frequency and time of settlement of
procured balancing services and BRP imbalances. The frequency
of settlement determines the periods over which costs are
aggregated and settled in one transaction, and the time of set-
tlement determines the time lapse between the end of the ag-
gregation period and the ﬁnancial settlement.3.3.5. Example of design: The Netherland
To give an actual example, we describe here the Dutch balancing
market in terms of the design variables described. This information
has been extracted from Autoriteit Consument and Markt (2014a,b)
and TenneT (2010, 2012a,b).
The Netherlands makes use of a Schedule Time Unit of 15 min.
Regarding the publication of national information, the Dutch TSO
TenneT provides the bid prices at certain spots in the bid ladder of
the next day (100MW, 300MW, and 600MW in both directions) on
its website. A minute-to-minute indication of the bid price of the
last activated bid and the minute-to-minute dispatched balancing
energy volumes are also provided there. Regarding zonal vs. nodal
responsibility, the balance responsibility applies to the Netherlands
as awhole, and responsibility for renewable generation lies fully with
the market (BRPs). Concerning net vs. separate positions, there is a
net balance for BRPs that includes both production and consump-
tion. The initial gate closure time is 2:00 p.m. on the day before
delivery (for all STUs of the next day). The ﬁnal gate closure time is at
10:00 a.m. on the day after delivery, which means that so-called
‘ex-post trading’ can take place, i.e., BRPs ‘trading away’ imbal-
ances with each other after real-time. The BRP accreditation re-
quirements include required expertise and technical, administrative
and organisational facilities, and a signed agreement concerning
ﬁnancial accountability and security.
The balancing service classes deﬁned in the Netherlands are
primary power, regulating power, reserve power, and emergency
power. Primary power is activated automatically and within sec-
onds based on frequency deviations. Regulating power can be
activated automatically and fully within 15 min, and is used to
remove the Area Control Error of the Netherlands. Reserve power is
not activated automatically, and/or is activated fully in more than
15 min. Emergency power is a last-resort service (interruptable
load), and is activated manually. Regarding reserve requirements,
101 MW of primary control capacity have been contracted in 2014
(this was the ﬁrst year such capacity was contracted and remu-
nerated). The TSO plans to reserve 215MWof regulating power and
350 MW of emergency power (only upward) for 2016, partly
through annual contracts and partly through quarterly contracts.12
The control system applied is the Load Frequency Control system
that is central to balance management in the synchronous zone of
continental Europe. Concerning methods of procurement, balancing
capacity is contracted bilaterally. Contracted regulating bids are put
into the main balancing energy market, the ‘regulating and reserve
market’. This market may both include regulating power bids and
reserve power bids. For power plants with a nominal capacity
larger than 60 MW it is mandatory to have the technical capability
to provide primary power, and all connected parties with more
than 60 MW capacity (per connection) are obliged to offer all
available up- and down-regulation capacity into this market.12 http://www.tennet.eu/nl/nl/nieuws/article/oproep-voor-de-levering-van-
regelvermogen-en-noodvermogen-in-2016-1.html, accessed on May 29, 2015.
13 Passive contribution is enabled by single imbalance pricing, which gives BRPs
the opportunity to proﬁt from imbalance settlement by having a BRP imbalance
that is opposite to the system imbalance.
14 Costs of portfolio balancing are not reﬂected in the balancing service and
imbalance prices, but are nevertheless part of the costs of balance management,
which in the end consumers pay for as well.
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TenneT contracts primary control capacity on a weekly basis.
Regulating power is contracted annually, but the market for regu-
lating and reserve power operates on a 15-min basis. On the day
before delivery, the bids must be submitted before 2:45 p.m. After
that, bids can be adapted up to 1 h before the STU of delivery. The
balancing service pricing mechanism applied in this market is mar-
ginal pricing; the set prices are called ‘regulation prices’. Contracted
balancing capacity is settled by pay-as-bid pricing. Next, regarding
the activation strategy, bids are activated in price order to restore
system balance. TenneT applies a reactive strategy, in which bids
are activated in response to actual system imbalances rather than in
anticipation to expected ones. Furthermore, multiple bids can be
activated in parallel. The bid requirements for regulating power
include a regulating speed of at least 7%/minute, a bid volume be-
tween 4 and 999 MW, and a bid price between 100,000 and
100,000 euro/MWh. There are no additional BSP accreditation
requirements.
In the Netherlands, allocation of balancing capacity costs occurs
by adaptation of the system services tariff. The allocation of
balancing energy costs occurs through imbalance settlement. The
Dutch imbalance pricing mechanism is quite elaborate. In principle,
single imbalance pricing is applied, but depending on the ‘regula-
tion state’ dual pricing may be applied (based on both the regula-
tion prices). Roughly, dual pricing is applied to STUs in which both
upward and downward regulation has been activated. In addition, a
so-called incentive component is added to the short imbalance
price and subtracted from the long imbalance price if two condi-
tions with regard to the number and size of involuntary energy
exchanges with foreign countries are met. This component is
determined weekly, does not change by more than 2 euro/MWh,
and cannot be lower than zero. Also, the imbalance price is set 10%
higher than the regulation price if emergency power has been
activated in the STU. There is no penalty for non-delivery for BSPs.
Activated balancing energy is automatically rewarded by the SO,
and the energy schedules of the corresponding BRPs are adapted
accordingly, which means that non-delivery creates a BRP imbal-
ance. Finally, the allocation of the net settlement sum occurs through
adaptation of the system services tariff, and the timing of settlement
is weekly.
4. Discussion
In this Section, the scope of the balancing market design chal-
lenge is outlined in more detail, by discussing three relevant as-
pects. First, we show that various trade-offs exist between
performance criteria (Section 4.1). Then, we elaborate on the un-
certain impact of design variables (Section 4.2). Third, we consider
the fact that the balancing market is embedded in the overall
electricity market (Section 4.3). This allows us to draw a richer
picture of the challenges involved in balancing market design, and
formulate design principles for policy makers (Section 4.4).
4.1. Performance criteria trade-offs
Here we provide a short overview of the full range of trade-offs
that exist among the balancing market performance criteria iden-
tiﬁed in Section 3.2. The trade-offs can be ordered in three classes:
trade-offs among security-of-supply criteria (security trade-offs),
trade-offs among security-of-supply and economic efﬁciency
criteria (security-efﬁciency trade-offs), and trade-offs among
market-facilitation criteria and security or efﬁciency criteria
(facilitation trade-offs).
Regarding security trade-offs, balance planning accuracy can be
traded off against availability of balance resources and balancequality. If the SO can procure more and quicker resources from the
market, this can improve the score on the last two criteria, but it
may also reduce balancing planning accuracy, as it results in lower
possibilities of, and incentives for, portfolio balancing. Portfolio
balancing is the BRP activity of balancing the energy portfolio in
order to minimise imbalance costs, and involves generation and
load forecasting, short-termmarket trading, and so-called ‘internal’
balancing (i.e., the real-time adjustment of generation and con-
sumption within the BRP portfolio). Lampropoulos (2014) states
that ‘passive contribution’ (voluntary contribution to system
balancing by BRPs) may result in substantial reductions of
balancing energy demand.13 On the other hand, it also reduces the
supply of balancing services to the SO. Thus, the effect of portfolio
balancing on availability of resources is not straightforward. Bal-
ance quality may be affected if BRPs overreact to system imbalances
and create frequency overshoots.
Regarding security-efﬁciency trade-offs, portfolio balancing again
plays a key role in the evaluation of balance planning accuracy vs.
utilisation efﬁciency. Improving the opportunities for portfolio
balancing (e.g., by setting the ﬁnal gate closure time closer to the
time of delivery) or the incentives for portfolio balancing (e.g., by
applying an imbalance pricing mechanism that results in higher
imbalance prices) improves the accuracy of system balance plan-
ning, but may cause inefﬁcient real-time balance management.
Inefﬁciencies may for example be caused by BRPs withholding
balancing resources for internal balancing, the use of more
expensive resources, and the regulation (ramping) of resources in
opposite directions at the same time.14 Furthermore, realising a
higher balance planning accuracy by creating overly strong imbal-
ance prices will affect cost allocation efﬁciency. Also, striving for a
high balance quality by dispatching quicker but more expensive
resources may improve balance quality, but damages utilisation
efﬁciency. Price efﬁciency may be compromised by a higher degree
of balancing resource contracting and longer contract periods
(motivated by the objective of high resource availability), because
the higher resource demand and uncertainty of resource value will
lead to higher (risk) premiums in the balancing capacity prices.
Facilitation trade-offs exist in relation to the performance criteria
of transparency and non-discrimination, but they are more difﬁcult
to make explicit. Non-discrimination is realised by creating a level-
playing ﬁeld for the market participants. Policy makers may aim to
design the balancing market such that, for example, small,
renewable or demand-side market participants are not at a disad-
vantage in playing the role of BSP and BRP, but if they create ex-
ceptions for such participants they thereby introduce
discrimination. The introduction of equal balancing rules and
conditions for all market participants would not only contribute to
non-discrimination, but also to market transparency and opera-
tional efﬁciency, as the regulatory regime is simpliﬁed. Other ef-
fects are less clear. For example, on the one hand, equal rules may
lead to a higher number of market participants who together in-
crease the supply of, and reduce the demand for, balancing re-
sources. On the other hand, equal rules may also give such strong
incentives to renewable energy producers that they balance their
energy portfolio less efﬁciently and effectively than would the SO.
Furthermore, the simpliﬁcation of balancing rules for the reason of
operational efﬁciency or transparency may be at the expense of the
15 In the German market in 2009, reserve capacity and balancing energy for
secondary control were procured in a single tender, which was held on a monthly
basis. Bids were selected based on the capacity price, but real-time activation was
based on the energy price. The selected bids formed the energy bid ladder, which
was ﬁxed for the entire month (Amprion, EnBW, TenneT Germany, and 50Hertz,
2011; Riedel and Weigt, 2007).
16 This results from the up-regulation bid prices having a higher mark-up
(compared to the day-ahead market price) than the down-regulation prices.
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example, increasing the length of the STU may reduce transaction
costs but also balance planning accuracy, and reducing the number
of balancing service markets increases transparency but could
damage price efﬁciency and balance quality.
As a last remark, between some performance criteria there is a
synergy rather than a trade-off. This is especially true for the re-
lations between utilisation efﬁciency, price efﬁciency, and cost
allocation efﬁciency, and the relations between non-
discrimination, transparency, and operational efﬁciency.
4.2. Impact of design variables
For many of the balancing market design variables the different
possible values (settings) can have widely diverging effects. In
addition, most variables affect multiple performance criteria. To
illustrate, we focus on the potential impact of three important
design variables on performance.
The determination of the Schedule Time Unit divides balance
responsibility between the System Operator and the Balance
Responsible Parties. Smaller STUs will give stronger incentives to
BRPs to balance their energy portfolio, as deviations from sched-
uled energy exchange during the STU will even out to a lesser de-
gree. As a result, power imbalances on the system level will be
smaller, which leads to a lower activation of balancing energy bids.
However, this leads in turn to lower imbalance prices, which
weakens the incentives to BRPs again. Thus, the STU certainly has
an impact on balance planning accuracy, but its nature is uncertain.
Furthermore, the changes in BRP portfolio balancing will change
the amount of offered balancing energy: Intra-day trade commits
ﬂexible resources, and balancing resources are kept by BRPs for
‘internal balancing’. Because intensiﬁed portfolio balancing will
thus both decrease the demand for and supply of balancing energy
services, the effects of the STU on availability of balancing resources
and price efﬁciency are not straightforward. Frunt (2011) ﬁnds in an
analysis on the effect of the STU on imbalances that the total
balancing effort of BRPs and the SO combined increases with an
increasing STU, and that this combined effort stabilises for STUs of
1 h and smaller (to about 2% of the yearly energy consumption).
This suggests that the value of both these criteria will decrease for
larger STUs. However, as the BRP portfolio balancing replaces more
efﬁcient centralised active balancing by the SO, a smaller STU may
reduce the utilization efﬁciency. Also, a smaller STU raises the
transaction costs, because energy schedules and balancing energy
bids are submitted more frequently.
The timing of balancing service markets is about the timing of
balancing service bid procedures and balancing service market
clearances. The timing of balancing service markets has a large
impact on the bidding behaviour of Balancing Service Providers. If
balancing capacity markets are cleared yearly, only BSPs with
balancing resources that are available across one whole year can
offer balancing resources, which is a substantial entry barrier for
smaller market participants and reduces the offering of balancing
capacity (i.e., utilization efﬁciency). As a result the price efﬁciency
will be low as well, and this is aggravated by the fact that BSPs must
predict the opportunity costs of balancing capacity procurement for
up to one year in advance. An advantage of long-term procurement
is a higher degree of certainty with regard to the availability of
balancing resources. In case of a daily balancing capacity market,
the coordination of timing of the balancing capacity market clear-
ance with the day-ahead market clearance becomes an issue.
Abbasy et al. (2010a) found that a balancing capacity market
clearance after the day-ahead market clearing will lead to the
lowest prices in both markets and highest balancing capacity vol-
umes, although this could result in a lower balancing resourceavailability. Furthermore, the frequency of clearing of balancing
energy markets also affects price efﬁciency. In case of marginal
pricing, a higher clearing frequency is likely to result in lower
balancing energy prices. However, if the market prices become too
low for BSPs to cover their costs, they may start to submit higher
bid prices, limiting this effect. Finally, a bid deadline that is well
before the clearing time will increase the uncertainties on proﬁts
and reduces the possibilities to participate in other markets, which
is likely to lead to higher bid prices. An example is given by the
comparison of the monthly secondary control reserves market in
Germany and the Dutch balancing energy market over the year
2009,15 made by Abbasy et al. (2010b). They observed signiﬁcantly
higher balancing energy prices (relative to intra-day prices) in
Germany, and attributed this to the monthly procurement and
corresponding ﬁxation of the balancing energy bid ladder in Ger-
many, which added to market uncertainties and opportunity costs
for German BSPs.
The imbalance pricing mechanism is the main design variable
determining the strength of the incentives that BRPs receive to
balance their energy portfolio. van der Veen et al. (2012) presented
an analysis of the impact of various imbalance pricing schemes,
taking into account the effects on BRP behaviour. The imbalance
pricing mechanism was found to exert a greater impact on the
actual imbalance costs paid by BRPs than on their portfolio
balancing strategies, because all schemes give the general incentive
to end up with a positive imbalance rather than a negative,16 due to
which BRPs usually end up with a small positive imbalance. Single
pricing led to the lowest actual imbalance costs, suggesting that
this mechanism results in the highest cost allocation efﬁciency.
Another positive effect is that it does not discriminate against small
players, because the relatively higher imbalances of small BRPs are
offset by the proﬁts of being in the right direction, which happens
more often for small BRPs (van der Veen et al., 2012). However, this
option provides weaker incentives for balance planning accuracy,
which may be problematic for systems in which balancing re-
sources are lacking.
From a wider perspective, and considering the entire balancing
market design space and performance criteria set, we note that the
balance planning variables generally impact on the criterion of
balance planning accuracy, as they inﬂuence the BRPs task of en-
ergy portfolio balancing. By contrast, the balancing service provi-
sion variables affect availability of balancing resources, utilisation
efﬁciency and price efﬁciency. Furthermore, the settlement vari-
ables affect cost allocation efﬁciency, and also balance planning
accuracy, because the way the costs are distributed determines the
incentives for BRPs to balance their energy portfolio. The main
variable affecting the criterion of transparency is the publication of
national information. Non-discrimination is affected by re-
sponsibility for renewable generation (as distinct balancing rules
for renewables are a form of market discrimination) and net vs.
separate positions (as a net position puts small players at a disad-
vantage, among others (NordREG, 2008)). Balance quality is mainly
inﬂuenced by the choice of control system and activation strategy.
Operational efﬁciency changes when the number of transactions
changes, and the Schedule Time Unit and the timing of balancing
service markets play a substantial role here.
17 We borrow this term from the EU electricity directive 2009/72/EC, which
stipulates that ‘appropriate incentives should be provided to balance the in-put and
off-take of electricity and not to endanger the system’ (European Commission,
2009).
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market design choices inﬂuence performance along multiple
criteria. Moreover, the effects are not obvious, as the mechanisms
taking place within the balancing market include feedback loops
between individual and system imbalance volumes and imbalance
costs (concerning BRPs) and between the volumes and prices of
offered balancing services and the volumes and prices of procured
balancing services (concerning BSPs).
4.3. Inter-linkage with the electricity sector
Because the balancing market is embedded in the electricity
market, power system andmarket conditions have a large inﬂuence
on the effects of balancing market design variables. Here we
address these inﬂuences for various (high-level) conditions.
First of all, the power system size has an inﬂuence on the impact
of balancing market design options. Both the amount of balancing
resources and the system imbalances will be higher in larger power
systems, but system imbalances may be relatively smaller, if the
various causes of imbalance are independent. Second, the national
electricity generation characteristics inﬂuence offered balancing
services, balancing costs, and system imbalances because they
determine the amount of available balancing resources and the
minimum level of balancing prices (which is the marginal costs of
ﬂexible power plants), and they affect the demand for system
balancing (due to the unpredictability of generation, and through
the level of inertia from power plants (Frunt, 2011)). Similarly,
consumption characteristics are inﬂuential because the predictabil-
ity of consumption affects the demand for balancing services, and
because the eligibility of load resources as balancing resources af-
fects the availability of these resources. The availability of trans-
mission capacity determines the occurrences of internal
congestions, which affects the availability of balancing resources
for system balancing. This may be because resources are located in
a congested area, or because they are used for redispatch
(congestion management). Regarding the day-ahead market and
intra-day market design a relevant sub-condition is the time unit
used in those markets compared to the STU; if these are equal, BRPs
are able to balance their energy portfolio by trading in those mar-
kets more accurately than if the time unit is larger than the STU. The
short-termmarket gate closure times are inﬂuential as well, as they
affect the accuracy of forecasting of generation and consumption.
Importantly, the fact that the balancing market is intertwined
with the rest of the electricity market also means that balancing
market design cannot be considered in isolation from overall
electricity market design. Therefore, current structures may limit
the design options for balancing markets and adaptation of the
balancing market design may require adaptation of other aspects of
electricity markets or power systems. Another implication is that
possible balancing market designs must also be evaluated against
higher-level electricity market objectives and performance criteria,
such as the pursuit of renewable energy targets (ENTSO-E, 2011).
4.4. Design challenge and principles
In view of our analysis, we can mark the contours of the
balancing market design challenge. First of all, the design frame-
work presented in Section 3 shows that there are many design
options, as well as many ways to assess performance, depending on
the importance given to each of the criteria. Secondly, from Section
4.1 we take away that multiple trade-offs exist between perfor-
mance criteria, which requires policy makers to prioritise criteria,
but also to carefully evaluate the double-edged effects that design
choices may have. Furthermore, the impact of many design choices
is uncertain and depends on market participant responses in termsof altered balance management practices, and because of the
complex interactions among individual practices and system-level
prices and costs, as illustrated in Section 4.2. This complexity is
enlarged by the existing inter-linkages between the balancing
market and the rest of the electricity market, as treated in 4.3.
Power system and market conditions inﬂuence the effects of
balancing market design choices. But, as such choices also affect
overall electricity market performance, consideration of broader
objectives may change the assessment of balancing market design
options yet again.
In sum, the scope of the balancingmarket design task is vast and
intricate. The design challenge for policy makers is to deal with the
complexity and uncertainties in a practical way, without ignoring
vital elements of balancing markets and their functions.
We suggest the following design principles to address this
challenge:
a. Reach agreement on key balancing market criteria and variables
b. Start from power system and market conditions
c. Consider future power system and market developments
d. Strive for appropriate incentives to market participants
e. Reduce uncertainties through in-depth analysis and monitoring
of performance
Policy makers should start with creating a common under-
standing of the balancing market design problem, and narrow the
scope of the design task through principle a. Principles b and c will
further limit the scope by ruling out design options that are
incompatible with current or future (desired) conditions, and
identifying the options that provide appropriate incentives to BRPs
and BSPs under these conditions (principle d). ‘Appropriate in-
centives’ are those that will trigger market behaviour that leads to
efﬁcient (low-cost) and effective (secure) balance management.17
To ﬁnd out which designs provide such incentives, empirical
analysis of current balancing markets and simulations are useful
(principle e).
Our framework can support the balancing market design pro-
cess by facilitating a systematic approach, in which all design op-
tions and performance criteria are consciously considered.
Therefore, the framework may be most useful at the start of policy-
making process, when prioritising the design variables and per-
formance criteria. However, because all variables and criteria play a
role in the balancing market, we recommend using the framework
as a reference throughout the design process. Furthermore, the
framework can help structure further research on balancingmarket
design.5. Conclusions
In the unbundled electricity markets in Europe, the balancing
market is the institutional arrangement required to maintain the
balance between electricity demand and supply. Several design
variables and performance criteria play a role. The framework
presented in Section 3 takes these into account to provide a sys-
tematic and structured approach to the design and analysis of
balancing markets. In view of the wide variety of design options,
the trade-offs among performance criteria, uncertainties about the
effects of design options, and the inter-linkages between the
balancing market and the overall electricity market, policy makers
R.A.C. van der Veen, R.A. Hakvoort / Utilities Policy 43 (2016) 186e194194face a substantial design challenge. This challenge can be met by
addressing key criteria and variables, by considering system and
market conditions and expected future developments, and by
identifying the design options that provide appropriate incentives
to market participants given all of these considerations.
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